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I. Introduction
The traditional focus of international trade theory has had limited overlap with the
analytical orientation of practitioners in the field of human resource management and
industrial relations (HRM/IR). This is an unfortunate lapse since both areas are concerned
with the issues of industrial growth, employment, and income distribution - issues that
are closely related to international comparative advantage and commercial policy.
Recently, trade economists have begun to explore the implications of international trade for
issues that have previously been considered the domain of labor economists, such as the
individual's decision to acquire an education, the likelihood of labor action in an industry,
and the size of the union wage premium over a competitive sector. This review is intended
to stimulate HRM/IR economists to consider general equilibrium influences on the behavior
of labor and to invite suggestions concerning the treatment of labor issues in international
trade models.
The traditional analysis of international trade under perfect competition, as
developed by Heckscher, Ohlin, Samuelson, Rybczynski, and others, produced a powerful
demonstration of the role of factor abundance in determining the pattern of trade, the
gains from free trade, and the impact of protection on factor income and employment. A
typical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model assumes a two-good, two-factor world
with perfect competition and constant returns to scale (CRS) technology. Both trading
partners are assumed to share identical homothetic preferences and production technology.
This model has been used to illustrate three remarkable propositions concerning the
effect of trade and commercial policy on the distribution of income. First, the Heckscher-




will produce relatively more of the labor intensive good and therefore will export that good.
Second, free trade will equalize the price of goods across countries, which will also equalize
the wage-rent ratio across both countries. This is the celebrated Factor-Price Equalization
Theorem. Third, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem identifies the effect of import protection
on the returns to capital and labor. Protection will tend to raise the domestic price of the
imported good. The real income of the factor used relatively intensively in the production
of the import will rise and the return to the other factor of production will fall. 1
The analysis of international trade and commercial policy changed course in the
1980s as a result of influential work by economists such as Paul Krugman, James
Brander, and Barbara Spencer.2 This new literature was spurred both by developments
in the field of industrial organization3 and by a growing discontent with the ability of
traditional trade theory to explain such puzzles as the existence of significant intra-
industry trade in homogeneous products and protectionist behavior by governments. The
central element of both the new international trade theory and the new industrial
organization is the relinquishing of the convenient assumption of perfect competition. This
leads to the unsettled world of imperfect competition, rents, and strategic interaction.
The results from the new models of imperfect competition pose a challenge for the
advocates of minimal government intervention in domestic or international trade.
Imperfect competition can generate "excess" profits or rents that accrue to the factors
employed in particular firms or particular industries. In certain cases, it may be possible
to strategically manipulate trade or domestic policy in order to capture larger market
shares in these industries. Imperfect competition also may increase the likelihood of
beneficial spill-overs from Rz\ expenditures or experience and could provide another
justification for promotion of an industry by direct subsidy, import protection, or export
promotion.
The modifications to the HOS view of international trade required by the
incorporation of scale economies and imperfect competition are presented in Section II.
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Some implications for commercial policy and some qualifications are outlined in Section III.
Several applications that focus on the returns to labor are used to illustrate the basic
results.
Although the recent work on strategic trade and industrial policy has received more
attention, there are other areas in which trade economists have begun to examine labor
related topics. A common component of these studies is the recognition by trade
economists that their models can be improved by eliminating the assumption that labor is
a homogenous input that is traded in a perfectly competitive market. While the treatment
of labor in these models is still rudimentary, they illustrate the benefits of combining the
general equilibrium perspective of international trade with the existing models of labor
economics.
Three sections summarize some work in these areas. Section IV examines the
models that incorporate imperfectly competitive labor markets. The inclusion of labor
rents dramatically increases the potential gain from strategic trade and industrial policy.
Section V reviews some international 'labor migration issues such as the impact of
migration on economies with unemployment. Finally, Section VI outlines some recent
work on the influence of international trade on human capital acquisition. These models
incorporate feedback effects of trade on the incentives to acquire human capital. Section
VII contains concluding comments.
II. The Gains from Trade in the Presence of Internal Economies of Scale
Recent work in international trade has focused on models of increasing returns to
scale (IRS) technology and imperfect competition. Interestingly, it has been found that the
presence of imperfectly competitive firms can reverse the conclusion that all countries will
gain from free trade. Yet, paradoxically, the loss of guaranteed gains has been
accompanied by the presumption that there is potentially more to be gained from
international trade under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. The gains
from international trade in an IRS model of identically endowed countries stemc primarily
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from two sources. First, trade can intensify the degree of competition, reduce a firm's
profit maximizing mark-up of price over marginal cost, and thereby increase output.
Second, trade can increase the product variety enjoyed by consumers.
Homogeneous Products
The benefit from improving the competitive environment is simply illustrated by
Brander (1981). He posits an identical pair of two-sector economies in which the first
sector is characterized by perfect competition and CRS, and the second sector has a
monopoly producer with IRS technology. In the absence of trade, the monopolist in each
country will set a profit-maximizing mark-up of price over marginal cost.
In the presence of trade, each former monopolist will want to take advantage of the
profit opportunities available by selling its product in the foreign market. The duopolists
created by the advent of trade in the imperfectly competitive sector, will take into account
the potential response of the other to any intrusion into the foreign market. A number of
patterns of strategic response have been explored, but a popular assumption is that the
two firms will behave as Cournot duopolists.
As is well known, two Cournot duopolists will sell more to a single market than a
single monopolist. Thus, output must rise and price must fall in the imperfectly
competitive sector, and the allocation of resources between perfectly and imperfectly
competitive sectors will be improved. This source of gain is sometimes referred to as the
'pro-competitive' effect of trade in imperfectly competitive markets and is shared by both
trade partners. A second source of gain, the realization of scale economies, will also
emerge in this example. Both of the IRS firms will increase output, moving down the
average total cost curve, so that the average productivity of at least one factor will rise.
Although Brander's model assumed that sector 2 was monopolized in autarky, there
are similar gains under other imperfectly competitive market structures. Markusen
(1981) analyzed the case in which the imperfectly competitive sector is characterized by
relatively free entry so that profits are driven to zero. The IRS industry, sector 2, is
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assumed to consist of n Cournot firms that each choose a profit-maximizing price and
output while taking the output of other firms as fixed. The equilibrium number of firms in
this model is determined by the zero-profits condition.
Now consider the possibility of trading with an identical country. The market for
good 2 will become an international market with total market demand doubled and the
number of firms doubled to 2n. The autarky price-quantity combination will no longer be
an equilibrium position. The representative firm still takes the output of the other 2n-1
firms as fixed, but now perceives its demand curve to have become more elastic. With the
market twice as large as in autarky, a small reduction in price by a representative firm
will yield a much larger expected increase in quantity demanded.
This increase in the firm's perceived elasticity of demand will result in a lower
profit-maximizing price and higher output. As in the Brander model, higher firm output
generates movement down the average total cost curve and an increase in factor
productivity. Productivity increases reflect the pro-competitive effect of trade that will
occur even when extra-normal profits are dissipated through entry.
Differentiated Products
The development of the IRS model has not been restricted to homogeneous products
and Cournot behavior. The approach pioneered by Krugman (1979, 1980), Helpman
(1981), and Lancaster (1979, 1980) assumes that consumers prefer variety and that each
firm sells a slightly differentiated product. This class of models introduces an additional
source of gain from international trade - increases in the variety of available products.
Krugman's (1979) model of differentiated products assumes that there is only one
industry, but that each firm produces a differentiated product using IRS technology and
labor as the only factor of production. Consumers have a utility function such that
demand functions have the property that an increase in quantity consumed is accompanied
by a fall in the elasticity of demand. Firms set a profit-maximizing price and quantity,
taking the price of other varieties as fixed, and free entry is assumed to yield zero profits.
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The change in state from autarky to trade with an identical country will initially
double the number of products available to consumers. A typical consumer will reduce
consumption of each individual domestic variety and begin consuming the imported
varieties. As noted above, a fall in per capita sales by each firm will increase the firm's
perceived elasticity of demand. As profit-maximizers, firms will respond to the increase in
elasticity by raising output and lowering price.
Due to the resource constraint, attempts to raise output must lead to some exit, but
the total number of firms in the world will not fall below n. Thus, consumers' utility is
higher because they can consume a greater variety of goods, and firms reap economies of
scale because of increased output. The usual gains from greater factor productivity are
supplemented by the gains from greater product variety.
There are two implications for labor in Krugman's model. First, the increase in the
scale of production will increase the productivity of labor. Second, two-way trade occurs in
identical or very similar products in the IRS models. That is, each country imports and
exports the same good, a phenomenon well documented in the trade statistics. As a result,
increased trade does not necessarily require that labor must be reallocated between
sectors. The existence of intra-industry trade leads each country to produce a larger
quantity of a smaller number of varieties so that factor employment in the industry could
remain close to the autarky level.
Example: The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area
The previous discussion is intended to give the flavor of the theoretical developments
in international trade with imperfectly competitive markets. The practical benefits of
these results can be illustrated by the recently ratified free-trade agreement between the
United States and Canada. Canadian econornists and policy makers have been concerned
for some time with the sizable difference between labor productivity in Canada and the
United States. Low Canadian productivity has persisted despite broad similarities
between the two countries in tastes, factor endowments, technology, and labor force
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quality. Recent Canadian interest in an agreement has been generated by a series of
studies that have found that steep tariff protection in Canada has resulted in sub-optimal
plant size and an excess of locally produced varieties4, which could explain the gap
between labor productivity in the United States and Canada.
Thus, Canadian policy analysts have placed great emphasis on the gains to Canada
of a reciprocal trade agreement. Tariff reductions by Canada would have a strong pro-
competitive effect on Canadian firms, which would be expected to lower price-cost margins,
stimulate firm output, increase the scale of production, and raise labor productivity. In
addition, reciprocal tariff reductions by the United States would give Canadian firms tariff-
free access to a large market, further raising the scale of production and factor
productivity.
A considerable amount of empirical evidence has been marshalled to support the
claimed benefits. Wonnacott (1975), using a partial equilibrium model, estimated that
removal of pre-Tokyo Round tariffs on U.S.-Canada bilateral trade would raise Canadian
GNP by 8.2 percent.5 Harris (1984) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model to generate the estimate that multi-lateral tariff removal would raise Canadian GNP
by 8.6 percent. Across the 29 sectors of the model, labor productivity rises by an average
of 32.5 percent. More recent work by Harris and others place the gain to Canada from an
FTA at a smaller but still sizable 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent of GDP.
Additional evidence for the existence of scale economies for Canadian firms has been
documented by Baldwin and Gorecki (1986). They treat scale as consisting of the
interrelated effects of plant size, number of products per plant, and length of production
runs. Relative labor productivity levels of matched Canadian and U.S. manufacturing
industries are calculated for 1970 and 1979 using a 4-digit SIC level of disaggregation.
Their results show productivity in Canadian plants to be as much as twenty percent below
U.S. productivity and they are able to explain about a third of this gap by scale differences
between the two countries. Scale disadvantage for Canadian manufacturing plants could
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be explained in part by high Canadian tariffs and seller concentration in import-competing
industries and by smaller plant sizes in areas where Canadian firms have a comparative
advantage but find their exports restricted.
III. Strategic Trade Policy
The traditional HOS trade model generally leads to the prescription of free trade as
an optimal policy. In particular, small countries enjoy their largest welfare gains when
there are no trade restrictions, and have no economic incentive to interfere with free
trade.6 These results change with the introduction of imperfectly competitive goods
markets and IRS technology. Market imperfections that are commonly thought to be
welfare reducing in autarky can provide new opportunities for using interventionist trade
policy to a country's national advantage.
This section contains some simple models in which strategic trade policy can be
welfare improving. Early versions of these models did not focus on the returns to labor or
labor's participation in the policy game, but later versions have made labor a key
component. This shift in attention is illustrated by an evaluation of the strategic potential
of the automobile industry, a case in which the benefits to labor may predominate.
Strategic Trade Policy (STP) and the Transfer of Economic Rent
The primary STP role is its use in transferring economic rent from a foreign
producer to a domestic producer, consumer, or government. For example, Brander and
Spencer (1985) demonstrate that an export subsidy can raise national welfare when a pair
of domestic and foreign firms that act as Cournot duopolists are competing for market
share in a third country.
An export subsidy paid to the domestic firm effectively reduces marginal cost,
thereby increasing the profit-maximizing level of output and lowering price. The subsidy
will. also disturb the Cournot equilibrium. A well known characteristic of a Cournot
equilibrium is that the lower cost firm has a larger rnarket share. It follows, then, that the
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fall in net marginal cost of the domestic firm raises the domestic firm's market share at
the expense of the foreign firm.
The subsidy will not generate a domestic welfare gain, however, unless the increase
in profits of the domestic firm exceeds the amount of the subsidy. Perhaps surprisingly,
this will always be the case. Domestic welfare must increase because the export subsidy
can be thought of as correcting a 'market failure' in the sense that the domestic firm is not
truly maximizing its profits when it treats the output of its competitor as fixed. The
domestic firm would do better if it took into consideration the reaction of its competition
and behaved as a Stackelberg leader.7 The export subsidy simply increases output to
the level that would be chosen by a Stackelberg leader.
This model also illustrates some of the difficulties with STPs. First, it is presumed
that the government recognizes the gain from Stackelberg leadership even though the firm
does not. This assumption is troubling since it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
the strategic content of a firm's observed behavior. However, the model's conclusion can
be generalized. Even though firms have an incentive to increase profits through entry-
deterring activities, governments will possess entry-deterring tools not available to firms
and may be able to act with greater credibility. Second, the model ignores the potential for
retaliation, which is likely because the export subsidy lowers the market share of the
foreign competitor.
This type of analysis can also be used to evaluate the optimal policy of the importing
country. The government in the importing country may realize that the foreign firm is
extracting monopoly rents from domestic consumers. - Brander and Spencer (1984) have
examined some cases in which an import tariff can be used to transfer economic rent from
the foreign producer to domestic firms or the government. They begin with a model in
which domestic consumers are supplied by a monopolistic foreign firm which sets a profit
maximizing price and quantity. The pre-tariff position has an equilibrium price, Po, and
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import quantity qo, as shown in Figure 1. If a specific tariff, t, is imposed on imports, it
would raise the consumer price to P1 and imports would fall to q1.
The tariff will be beneficial if it can be shown that the tariff revenue is greater than
the lost consumer surplus. Lost consumer surplus is shown by area A + B in Figure 1,
and tariff revenue is shown by area C. The case of linear demand provides a simple
illustration. Marginal revenue, MR, is twice as steep as the demand curve, so area C is
twice as large as area A. As long as imports fall by less than 66%, B is no larger than A,
and the tariff revenue will exceed the lost consumer surplus. The tariff is a rent-shifting
policy since it has captured monopoly profits from the foreign firm for the benefit of the
domestic treasury.
This model also provides an opportunity to illustrate the sensitivity of the results to
the specification of the underlying model. The example of Figure 1 can be easily modified
such that an import subsidy is the optimal policy. Recall that the possibility that tariff
revenue would exceed lost consumer surplus turned on the assumption that the MR curve
is steeper than the demand curve. However, for a wide class of demand functions, such as
the constant elasticity of demand case, the MR curve may be flatter than the demand
curve.
Thus far, it has been shown that an import tariff can extract economic profits from
a foreign firm that sells to the domestic market. Remarkably, an import tariff can also
help a domestic firm extract rent from foreign consumers. Examination of this possibility
was motivated by the apparent success of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of
Asia in expanding their export base through import protection.
These ideas were formalized by Krugman (1984) in a model in which one local and
one foreign firm play a Cournot game in each other's markets, and marginal cost is
assumed to be declining in output. An import tariff effectively raises the cost to the
foreign firm of doing business in the domestic market. This increase in cost will alter the
equilibrium in the domestic market by lowering the foreign firm's market share and raising
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output of the domestic firm. The increased output of the domestic firm will reduce its
marginal cost, thus raising its market share in the foreign market, as well. Hence,
exports rise and the domestic firm obtains a larger market share in both the domestic and
foreign markets.
Other Motives for Strategic Trade Policy
Welfare-improving intervention policies also exist in models without extra-normal
profits and barriers to entry. Venables (1985) has analyzed a market segmentation model
in which a tariff can be used to force both domestic and foreign firms to cover their fixed
cost with charges to foreign customers only, thus transferring consumer surplus from
foreign consumers to domestic consumers. This model assumes a set of Cournot firms in
each country and free entry guarantees zero profits. The model also makes the strong
assumptions that firms are not able to arbitrage between national markets and a
representative firm has a greater relative market share on domestic sales than on exports.
The absence of arbitrage allows firms to price discriminate between the two markets, with
a separate equilibrium price emerging in each.
Consider the Venables' model in the case in which country A imposes an import
tariff on imports from country B. The net receipts for country B firms would fall and they
would face negative profits. Equilibrium prices must adjust so as to raise profits for
country B firms while maintaining zero profits for country A firms. This is accomplished
by an increase in the price paid by country B consumers, where country B firms have a
relatively large market share, and a fall in the price paid by country A consumers. The
tariff imposing government will earn extra revenue and consumer prices in country A will
fall, raising consumer surplus. The tariff effectively transfers consumer surplus from




Recent STP modeling has recognized that labor differs from other factors of
production because of its ability to legally organize and behave in concert. These models
have included labor as an actual or potential actor in policy games. However, it is
important to note that the treatment of labor in international trade models remains
incomplete. In particular, the models reviewed in this section rely on primitive
unionization models which do not make use of an efficient bargaining environment.8
Brander and Spencer (1988)9 have examined the strategic response of organized
labor when an optimal trade policy is pursued for a unionized oligopoly. They are
concerned with the ability of the union to capture part of the benefits of a rent-shifting
subsidy or tariff, and the impact of this behavior on the optimal level of intervention. The
essence of their model can be seen in the standard example of an international Cournot
duopoly. The previous model is modified by assuming that the supply of labor to the local
firm is controlled by a union which maximizes some function of real wages and total union
employment.
Equilibrium will be determined by a two-stage game. In the first stage, the union
and the firm bargain over the wage. In the second stage, the level of employment is the
outcome of the Cournot rivalry between the domestic and foreign firms. The game is said
to be sub-game perfect since the firm and the union understand the implications of the
wage set in the first stage for output, price, and employment of the second stage. As
would be expected, if the union increases the domestic wage, it will directly lower the
firm's profits. More importantly, there will be a profit loss due to the weakened
competitive position of the domestic firm relative to the foreign firm.
Government can be added to this game as a third player. The government will be
assumed to know how the other players will respond to each potential policy and to pick
the policy that will maximize national welfare. A production subsidy would lower the
domestic firm's perceived marginal cost, which improves its competitive position relative to
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the foreign firm. The domestic firm's market share increases, so that the subsidy has a
rent-shifting effect.
Increased profitability of the firm is likely to raise union wage demands, which in
turn can reduce the effectiveness of the government policy by raising the firm's marginal
cost. The higher marginal cost for the firm weakens its competitive position and results in
a smaller market share. A greater subsidy would be required to accomplish the same
degree of rent-shifting from the foreign firm, which implies that the optimal production
subsidy will tend to be higher in the presence of the union.
This model, however, is subject to the criticism that the union is not following a
sophisticated strategy that maximizes the return to the domestic industry and divides the
resulting quasi-rents via the collective bargaining agreement. The major implication of
this model arises from an inefficient linking of the negotiated wage rate to the product
price, instead of using the wage rate in a purely allocative fashion to divide the ex-post
quasi-rents. 10
Examples: Strategic Trade Policy and the Interests of Labor
The practical applicability of the theoretical gains from a STP remains a topic of
debate. A recent survey of the issues and evidence by Katz and Summers (1989) seems to
rule out rents to capital as a basis for a STP. They conclude that labor market rents are
likely to be a more important motivation for adopting an industrial policy.1 1
Katz and Summers examine a variety of data sources to determine whether or not
there exist significant compensation differences across two-digit categories of U.S.
industries that can not be explained by the characteristics of the workers, the
characteristics of the industries, or the degree of unionization. They find substantial
unexplained wage differences in the measures they construct from 1984 CPS data, and
find that these differences hold up over finer occupational disaggregation, over time, and
over countries.1 The possibility that these differences are due to compensating
differentials or unobserved ability instead of rents are rejected based on the persistence of
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the differences, evidence on quit rates, and data on wages of individuals who move
between industries.
Katz and Summers use a stylized model of an economy with one primary and one
secondary sector to illustrate the point that policy measures to expand employment in the
"premium wage" sector will be welfare improving. They find the standard deviation of the
unexplained nonunion wage differences to be about 18 percent, which suggests that a
primary sector wage subsidy could generate a substantial welfare gain.
Katz and Summers develop further evidence on the likely benefits of export
promotion versus import protection by comparing the skill adjusted wage differentials for
imports and exports of manufactured goods. Export industries resemble primary sector
firms and have wages that are 11 percent above the manufacturing average. Import
industries, with the exceptions of autos and steel, resemble secondary sector firms and
have wages that are 15 percent below average. Between 1960 and 1980 the number of
jobs lost due to imports was roughly equal to the number of jobs gained from exports. This
should have generated a substantial welfare gain for the United States and further gains
might accrue from policies that promote the continuation of this trend.
The question of the potential benefits from a STP was approached very differently
by Dixit (1988). He focused on the U.S. automobile industry as a source of potential
benefit from STPs because of the potential for strategic rivalry between the United States
and Japan, oligopoly in production, and monopoly rents to labor. His study investigates
the benefits of an "optimal" tariff or subsidy policy using a simple static model of the
United States and Japan.
The model treats demand as linear, marginal cost as constant, and the various car
models are differentiated only by national origin of production. Oligopolistic behavior is
modeled as a Nash equilibrium with conjectural variations. Although the conjectural
coefficients are not structural values, they provide a convenient way to represent differing
degrees of competition and can be determined by calibration using data for the years of
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interest. The model is used to examine optimal policies for 1979 and 1980. Calibration of
the model for these years is performed by reproducing the initial equilibrium with only the
MFN tariff applied to Japanese imports.
Dixit runs simulations over alternative policies and parameter values and finds that
the degree of monopoly rents in U.S. labor costs plays a major role in determining the
optimal trade policy. Under the assumptions of central parameter values and no labor
rents, the optimal tariff is 17 percent. If the optimal tariff were imposed, U.S. real income
would have increased by $80 million in 1979. However, under the assumption that half of
U.S. labor cost is monopoly rent, the optimal tariff for 1979 is 24% which would increase
national income by $185 million. A production subsidy rather than an import tariff,
however, proved to be a superior policy. If no monopoly rent is assumed to exist, the
optimal production subsidy yields a gain of $251 million and the monopoly rent case yields
a gain of $1.94 billion in 1979.
Dixit emphasizes that his results are preliminary and give only an upper bound for
the benefits of an STP. The gains could be greatly reduced by dropping the assumptions
that only the United States engages in policy, there is no retaliation to U.S. policy, and
that subsidies do not stimulate increased monopoly in the output or labor markets.
Nevertheless, the results effectively illustrate the points that gains from STPs are likely to
be small unless there are large labor rents to be captured and that the optimal policy may
be promotion rather than protection.
IV. Labor Market Imperfections and International Trade
The incorporation of labor market imperfections has affected both the discussions of
strategic trade policy and the development of the modern theory explaining the pattern
and gains from trade. This section will outline several areas in which abandoning the
assumption of competitive labor markets has led to qualifications of the standard results of
theoretical trade models.
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The effect of unionized labor on the basic results of trade theory is reviewed first.
The general question of interest is how the presence of a labor union affects the political
economy of protectionism. That is, what is labor's interest in protectionism and under
what circumstances will a consensus for protectionism develop within an industry? This
framework is then used to consider how the presence of a labor union affects the ability of
an economy to adjust to changing comparative advantage. These models provide an
explanation for the surprising observation that the union wage premium sometimes rises
in declining industries.
The Political Economy of Protectionism and a Unionized Sector
Recent experience with appeals for protection suggests that the appeal will be
supported by all factors of production within a sector. This unanimity runs counter to the
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem which concludes that protection benefits factors of production
rather than industries. According to this theorem, protection of a capital intensive
industry lowers the wage and increases the return to capital. Thus, the owners of labor
and capital should not agree on which industry to protect.
This unanimity has previously been explained by short run models in which factors
are sector specific, but the existence of imperfect labor markets provides an alternative
view. Hill (1984) finds that import protection may be sought by unionized labor in a
capital intensive industry if the import protection allows the union to increase the union
wage premium over the nonunion wage.
Hill considers a standard two-good two-factor model in which one sector has a
unionized labor force. The mark-up of the optimal union wage over the nonunion wage
follows the monopoly pricing rule and is inversely related to the elasticity of the demand
for labor in the unionized sector. The elasticity of demand for labor in the unionized sector
varies positively with labor's cost share and, therefore, with the wage-rent ratio (as long
as the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less than unity).
17
Consider now the effect of a tariff induced increase in the domestic market price of
the unionized good. According to the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, an increase in the
output price of the unionized sector will raise the return to the factor used intensively in
that sector. If the unionized sector is capital intensive, then the wage-rent ratio will fall in
both sectors. Labor, then, is worse off in terms of both goods.
However, the decline in the wage-rent ratio will also raise the mark-up of the union
wage over the nonunion wage. For sufficiently small values of the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor, the gap between the union and nonunion wage may rise enough
that the real income of union members actually rises, thus making support for protection
unambiguously in the union's interest. As a result, we may find both factors of production
in the unionized sector supporting protection.
The Hill model is, of course, vulnerable to the same criticism applied to the Brander
and Spencer (1988) model of union behavior. If Hill had used an efficient contract
framework, then the union would benefit as long as the rents to the protected industry rose
by enough to offset the lower competitive wage rate resulting from protection.
Labor Unions and Changing Comparative Advantage
Trade economists have also used unionization to help explain why an economy might
adjust slowly to declining competitiveness and increased imports. Grossman (1984)
considers the contribution of a seniority system for hires and layoffs to slow union wage
adjustment in the face of declining demand. His model is similar to Hill's, but Grossman
assumes an extreme production technology in order to focus on the effect of union behavior
on wage demands.
The union is modeled as setting wages by majority vote, so that the expected utility
of the median voter is maximized. Union members are employed in order of seniority,
with the most senior hired first or laid-off last. The seniority of the median voter is
assumed to depend on the size of the union. The smaller the union the higher the seniority
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ranking of the median voter, and the greater the probability of getting hired for each wage
demand. Thus, the smaller the union, the higher the union wage demanded.
Grossman uses this framework to analyze the impact of an increase in international
competition that reduces the world price of the union good. The decline in price reduces
the probability that the median voter will be employed at the current wage, and will tend
to reduce the union's wage demand. However, the deterioration in the industry's
competitive position will also worsen the most junior union member's employment
prospects. As a result, the union will shrink and the seniority rank of the median member
will rise. It is theoretically possible for the seniority rank of the median member to rise
sufficiently that the wage demand actually increases.
Staiger (1988) has shown that the union wage may rise in the face of intensified
international competition if import penetration leads domestic production to become more
capital intensive. Increased capital intensity lowers labor's cost share, which causes the
elasticity of demand for labor to fall and raises the optimal mark-up of the union wage
over the nonunion wage.
Empirical evidence supports this conclusion. Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) point
out that U.S. auto and steel workers receive a wage premium over the manufacturing
average that is significantly higher than that received by their Japanese counterparts.
They also report that during the 1970s, the compensation of steel and auto workers
increased 30 and 15 percent more, respectively, than the average of the 57 3-digit SIC
industries that they studied.
These seemingly large wage differentials are often used to explain the loss of U.S.
competitiveness, but models from international trade suggest that the causality runs in the
opposite direction. Loss of international competitiveness raises the union wage. However,
it is again worth noting that these models rely on union behavior which does not maximize
the present value of the union's share of the industry's quasi-rents.
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V. International Factor Mobility and Labor Migration
The proposition that international trade will equalize the returns to factors across
countries, is one of the major results of the traditional HOS trade theory. When factor-
prices are not equalized, the owners of a country's relatively abundant factor will face a
strong incentive to move to a country where it yields a higher return. Although this
incentive exists for the owners of all factors of production, labor movements provide its
most dramatic and wrenching expression.
Much of the recent U.S. interest in international factor mobility has been generated
by the case of the United States and Mexico, with a labor flow from Mexico to the United
States and a capital flow out of the United States. The difficult question faced by economic
policy analysts becomes, "is it better for the United States to allow labor inflows and
prevent capital outflows, or should the United States prohibit labor inflows and promote
capital outflows?"1 3
The Factor-Price Equalization Theorem is fairly fragile, and can fail to hold simply if
there are more inputs in an economy than outputs. As a result, a modified HOS model
with two factors of production, but only one good, has become a common framework for
analyzing international factor mobility.
Failure of factor-price equalization in the HOS model implies that producers in the
two countries face different relative factor prices and thus adopt different techniques of
production. The use of two different production techniques will not be as efficient as a
single technique since isoquants are assumed to be strictly convex. This inefficiency will
leave the world inside its production possibility frontier.
In the context of the perfectly cornpetitive full employment HOS model, international
factor mobility will equalize factor returns across national borders, moving the world
economy toward the production possibility frontier. Free factor trade will be mutually
beneficial for both countries, and since capital and labor are treated symmetrically, it will
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not matter which factor migrates.14 Certain types of market failure that qualify these
conclusions are discussed in the following sections.
Market Power in Factors
A large country with international market power can usually do better than free
trade as long as its trading partner does not retaliate. This is the case in factors markets
as well as goods markets. Hence, the United States might actually gain by limiting the
export of capital to the rent-maximizing monopsony level by imposing a capital export tax.
U.S. residents could also extract foreign rents by controlling the immigration of
labor. Note, however, that the restriction would have to take the form of a tax on
immigrants, not the form of an immigration quota. An immigration quota would simply
transfer the rents associated with the exercise of U.S. market power to the immigrant, so
that the welfare of current U.S. residents would not increase.1 5
Introducing the exercise of market power destroys the symmetry of the model, so
that labor imports and capital exports will generate different results. An intriguing
argument first made by Ramaswami (1968), and later formalized by Calvo and Wellisz
(1983), demonstrates that importing labor is superior to exporting capital!
The argument in favor of labor imports is most easily made by considering each
policy in turn. First, consider the capital export case. Let U.S. capital move to Mexico,
subject to an optimal capital export tax. This policy leaves the return to capital in Mexico
above the U.S. rate, and the return to labor in Mexico below the U.S. rate.
Now consider the creation of an enclave in the United States. This enclave would
contain U.S. capital repatriated from Mexico, and all Mexican workers employed by this
capital. The actual national location of this capital and labor would not effect the welfare
of the two countries, given the existence of the enclave. Thus, the enclave policy has the
same welfare implications for both countries as the capital export policy.
However, the creation of an enclave would not be the welfare maxirnizing policy for
the United States. Since the capital-labor ratio in the enclave would be lower than in the
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rest of the country, two different techniques of production are being used to produce the
same good. Output in the United States would be increased if the barriers creating the
enclave were removed and a single technique of production were adopted. The United
States could guarantee that previous residents receive all of the output increase by taxing
away the increased wages of enclave laborers.1 6
The point of this exercise is to show how the restricted capital export policy can be
viewed as employing U.S. capital with different techniques of production at home and
abroad. There will be gains to be made by transferring capital and labor to the United
States so that the techniques of production can be unified.
Jones, Coelho, and Easton (1986) have pointed out that there is no reason to limit
the import of capital (and the labor it employs) to American owned capital. The movement
of a bundle of Mexican capital and labor into the U.S. enclave will produce the same result
as before. Once again, total U.S. production can be increased by unifying the production
process in the enclave with the production process in the rest of the United States.
The efficiency gains from the shift of Mexican capital and labor to the United States
could again be captured by taxation. A tax on immigrant labor would leave Mexican
workers with the same after-tax wage as they would receive in Mexico. Mexican capital
would have to be subsidized in order to receive the same return as it would receive in
Mexico. The tax on immigrant labor and the subsidy to Mexican capital would hold the
factor payments to Mexican capital and labor constant, leaving any increased production
accruing to U.S. owned factors of production and to the U.S. government.
The labor import policy requires a discriminatory tax on immigrant labor which
would generally be considered to be morally undesirable and politically unacceptable.
Calvo and Wellisz (1983) show that the same results can be affected through a
government-formed capital export cartel. This capital export cartel would follow two
operating principles. First, the cartel would exercise its market power by hiring labor in
Mexico at the rent-maximizing monopsony rate. Second, the cartel would export capital
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only up to the point where the return to capital in the two countries will be equalized.
Equalizing the return will guarantee that all U.S. capital uses the same technique of
production, whether in the United States or Mexico.
Labor Market Imperfections
Many of the political objections to labor migration stern from problems generated by
factor market imperfections. Imperfections in the labor market could significantly change
the results of the preceding models and alter the optimal ranking of policies. For example,
Brecher and Choudhri (1987) conclude that when there is a real minimum income
guarantee, any labor immigration will lower national welfare.
The model of Brecher and Choudhri contains a minimum income guarantee that is
provided through a package of unemployment compensation and welfare payments. The
minimum real wage pegs the marginal product of labor, and determines labor employment
and output for each level of the capital stock. Given labor employment and the capital
stock, the level of GNP is also fixed. Since total employment and output are fixed, each
immigrant displaces one native worker but has no effect on total output. Any positive
factor payment to immigrant labor will accordingly lower the output available for native
consumption.
The Brecher and Choudhri framework contains an incentive for capital exports only
if the average product of capital at home is lower than the marginal product of capital
abroad. Exporting a unit of capital leaves some domestic labor unemployed and causes
domestic production to fall by the average product of capital. By comparison, the capital
export earns the marginal product of capital in the foreign country. As long as the
domestic average product of capital is less than the foreign marginal product of capital, the
capital export generates a net national gain.
However, the Ramaswami argument can be equally well applied to the Brecher and
Choudhri result that labor immigration is never welfare improving for a minimum wage
economy. Repatriating capital and the foreign labor that it employed to a domestic enclave
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would certainly have no effect on domestic welfare. Moreover, further gains would be
possible if a single production process were adopted economy wide, though this would
require that the minimum income guarantee scheme be replaced by a wage subsidy paid
exclusively to nationals.
The Brecher and Choudhri result is further qualified if the assumption that migrant
and native workers are perfect substitutes in production is relaxed. An industry which is
losing its comparative advantage might increase the employment of unskilled immigrant
labor to hold down production costs. This could increase home welfare by saving the jobs
of skilled native labor.
Ethier (1985) has derived some interesting results on the relationship between factor
substitutability and optimal migration. Consider, for example, a decline in demand for the
export good which is accompanied by a decline in the real wage for migrant labor. This
type of secular decline in the commodities market and the migrant labor market could
occur if the host country's export market is the same as the market from which it hires
migrant labor.
The introduction of this correlation will cause a decline in export demand to have
both positive and negative influences on the employment of native labor. On the one hand,
the fall in the cost of migrant labor will induce firms to substitute migrant workers for
native workers. The higher the elasticity of substitution (s) between migrant and native
labor the larger the employment decline.
On the other hand, the fall in the cost of migrant labor will tend to lower the cost of
production, raise output, and increase the employment of native workers. The extent of
this output increase will depend on the elasticity of demand for the firm's product. High
values of the elasticity of demand (h), will increase the level of output and the demand for
native labor. In fact, if h > s, the welfare of native workers will be increased by the
reduced probability of layoff under adverse conditions. However, if demand is
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insufficiently elastic, or migrant and native labor are very substitutable, then h < s. The
substitution effect will dominate and native workers will be worse off in this case.
Strategic Trade Policy and International Capital Flows
The analysis presented above has emphasized the interests of the capital abundant
country in its decision to import the scarce factor, labor. These results do not apply to the
decision faced by a labor abundant country with unemployment. Das (1981) has analyzed
the case in which the labor abundant country has unemployment and sets a real minimum
wage. Recall that in the absence of unemployment, a labor abundant country has an
incentive to exercise its market power by taxing capital inflows. However, in the presence
of unemployment, it is possible that the optimal policy is a subsidy to capital inflows that
will increase employment.
There are many cases when a government could attack an unemployment problem
by a policy of attracting foreign capital. Brander and Spencer (1987) compare an optimal
tariff and an optimal production tax given the existence of unemployment. They analyze
the optimal policy response when a foreign firm is considering whether to supply the home
country market from a plant located in the foreign country or from a plant located in the
home country. Typically, foreign investment in the home country will be deterred by high
production taxes in the home country, but promoted by a high import tariff.
The presence of high tariffs may not stimulate foreign direct investment, however, if
the firm believes that once the capital is in place, the government will then replace the
import tariff with a production tax. In order to induce foreign direct investment, the
government must credibly precommit to a policy which will make foreign direct investment
the profit-maximizing choice for the foreign firm.
The firm will prefer foreign direct investment only if it believes that its profits under
an optimal production tax will always be greater than under an optimal import tariff.
Rernarkably, this proves to be the ease. The government's motivation for taxing the
foreign firm is to extract economic rents earned by the firm. If the firm undertakes foreign
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direct investment, taxing the firm will lead to lower firm output and higher unemployment.
In contrast, if the foreign firm supplies the market through exports, raising an import
tariff leads to no unemployment penalty since production is taking place in the foreign
country. Consequently, the optimal production tax is lower than the optimal import tariff
and the foreign firm will prefer foreign direct investment. The host government is able to
credibly precommit to the production tax because of the unemployment associated with a
tax-induced reduction in output.
VI. International Trade and the Acquisition of Human Capital
The factor proportions theory of the determinants of international trade predicts
that a country will export the good that uses intensively its relatively abundant factor.
For example, the United States is relatively abundantly endowed with human capital, so
its export bundle will require more human capital to produce than its import bundle.
To the extent that education contributes to the development of human capital, the
forces of international trade can have an effect on the decision to acquire an education.
Interestingly, interaction between the trade and education sectors may actually have the
effect of widening the education disparity between two trading nations. Trade could cause
a decline in the human capital stock of the human capital scarce country, and an increase
in the human capital abundant country. If there are social benefits attendant to a high
level of education in the population, international trade may be detrimental to the human
capital scarce country. Some trade models that incorporate human capital acquisition will
be used to illustrate the possibilities.
The Acquisition of Human Capital
Recently, Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) and Borsook (1987) have worked on the
interaction of human capital acquisition17 and the factor-proportions theory of
international trade. Both papers assume that individuals are faced with the choice of
earning the wage paid to unskilled labor, or investing in an education that leads to the
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higher wage paid to skilled labor. Education is assumed to be produced using physical
capital specific to the education sector of the economy. (Education capital used to produce
education services hould not be confused with the human capital embodied in an educated
worker.) The output of the educational sector is increasing in the number of people seeking
eduction but the educational production function is subject to diminishing marginal returns.
Individuals will seek education if it produces a discounted net present value of earnings
that is greater than or equal to the discounted present value of unskilled worker earnings.
This familiar human capital model is imbedded in a standard HOS trade model in
which skilled and unskilled labor are used to produce two goods. At each set of relative
wages, good 1 is produced with relatively more skilled labor per unit of unskilled labor
than good 2. Goods prices are given by the terms of trade on the world market, and wages
are determined by the zero-profits condition.
The Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem for such a world becomes, "the country which is
abundantly endowed with education capital will export the skill intensive good." An
increase in a country's stock of education capital will reduce its marginal product and
lower the cost of an education. As additional unskilled workers find it profitable to obtain
an education, the number of unskilled workers declines. Both output and exports of the
skill intensive good will rise, output of the other good will fall, and imports of the other
good will rise.
One important conclusion from this model is that workers in the skill abundant
country do not gain from trade, since all gains accrue to the owners of education capital.
Prior to the opening of trade, the skill-intensive good is relatively cheap in the education
capital abundant country, and the other good is relatively expensive. The opening of trade
will relieve the relative scarcity of the good with the lower skill content, and its price will
fall.
Application of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem shows that the wage of unskilled
labor must fall and the wage of skilled workers must rise, since the opening to trade
10
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causes a price increase for the skill intensive good in the education capital abundant
country. The wage gap will increase the demand for education, which will raise the cost of
education, thereby lowering the life-time earnings of skilled workers to the new lower level
of unskilled workers. Thus, both skilled and unskilled labor are worse off. However, the
increase in the number of people seeking an education will increase the marginal
productivity of education capital so that the return to education capital owners will
increase. The opposite occurs in the country for which education capital is scarce.
A second and more important conclusion from this model is that trade increases the
stock of skilled labor in the education capital abundant country, and lowers the stock of
skilled labor in the other country. In other words, international trade depresses the
incentive to obtain an education in the skill scarce country. This change in the skilled
labor stock accentuates the differences in endowment that existed prior to the opening of
trade.
Heterogenous Ability
Findlay and Kierzkowski used the simplifying assumption that all individuals are
identical. The introduction of heterogeneous abilities complicates the model but provides a
more realistic representation of the process of human capital acquisition. Borsook (1987)
introduces heterogeneity by allowing for a continuum of abilities throughout the population.
The amount of skill acquired from a given amount of education is assumed to depend on
the innate ability of the individual.
The worker at the educational margin will be indifferent between acquiring an
education and remaining unskilled. The conditions which determine the educational
margin in this model are basically the same as those for the previous case. The difference
is that the net earnings of the infra-marginal skilled worker exceed those of the skilled
worker at the margin. This follows from the assumption that a dollar's worth of
expenditure on education will purchase more skill units for the worker with greater innate
ability.
28
An important implication of this extension is that international trade will not be
sufficient to generate the Pareto Optimal level of education for the world as a whole. This
can be illustrated by considering two identical countries that face the same prices on the
world market. Holding world prices fixed, allow the stock of education capital to increase
in one country. The increase in the capital stock must cause the marginal product of
education capital to fall, so that the cost of education capital will fall. As a result, some
less innately able workers will now find it worthwhile to obtain an education, and the
equilibrium return to capital will be lower in this country.
A lower return to education capital in the capital abundant country implies that the
marginal worker receiving an education in the education capital abundant country is less
innately able than the marginal skilled worker in the capital scarce country. Policy
intervention in the education market, therefore, could be Pareto improving from a world
point of view. Alternatively, students from the capital scarce country will find it worth
their while to attain an education in the education capital abundant country.
A last point to note is that trade leaves the mean skill level of the distribution of
skilled workers in the education capital abundant country, higher than in the labor
abundant country. While trade equalizes the cost of a skill unit between the two countries,
the cost of education capital in the education capital abundant country is lower than in the
education capital scarce country. Therefore, net earnings of skilled workers are higher in
the education capital abundant country.
VII. Conclusions
The study of market imperfections has been a dominant theme in international
econornics over the last decade. This area had previously received little attention because
the earliest trade theorems rnade a strong case that border controls were rarely the first
best response to market failure. Although it was recognized that import controls could be
used to exercise international market power associated with a country's size, international
economists generally rejected this as a serious policy option. The optimal tariff was
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considered to be a 'beggar thy neighbor' policy that would move the world economy below
its production possibility frontier.
The focus on general equilibrium analysis, Pareto optimality, and national interest
has lead trade economists to analyze economic issues somewhat differently than labor
economists. Trade economists have been willing to sacrifice many details of individual
behavior and market function for the "greater" goal of obtaining general equilibrium
results. A notable example is the way union behavior is represented in the few trade
models that include it at all.
The attention given national advantage can seem abstract and somewhat removed
from the human side of real world issues. For example, the trade economists'
preoccupation with the exercise of monopsony power when analyzing immigration issues
must strike the labor economist as simply bizarre.
When the 'new' international economics is placed in proper perspective, it becomes
apparent that many of the conclusions of the 'old' international analysis continue to hold.
Deardorff and Stern (1987) argue that the motivation of many of the strategic trade
polices is simply the traditional exercise of market power. An obvious example is the
taxation of imports from a foreign monopolist. The essential objective of the policy is to
lower the price received by the foreign monopolist for its exports.
Another idea recycled by the strategic trade proponents is the notion that market
efficiency can be improved by subsidizing the producers in an imperfectly competitive
market. The same optimal policy prescription that has never been attractive enough for
domestic application becomes more palatable when the competing firm is in a foreign
country.
Nevertheless, the new international analysis has clarified the issues involved in
various trade policies. It has resulted in a rethinking of our policy of protection for the
domestic automobile industry. Previously, auto protection was thought to reduce national
welfare, and was justified as temporary support to ease the movement of workers to other
V
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industries. The analysis of Katz and Summers and Dixit makes a serious case for
preserving auto industry jobs in order to retain rents inherent in the industry. Auto
protection may actually be welfare improving. A similar reclassification applies to some
export subsidies.
It remains difficult to conceive of a practical scheme to identify the 'strategic'
industries that would benefit from intervention. The ex post identification of successes
must be balanced by a host of failures. Moreover, policy games between governments are
complex, and analytical solutions for even simple games are difficult to obtain. Computer
simulations offer opportunities for utilizing more complicated models, but thus far the
models have not proven to be robust. Small changes in model parameters will often shift
the optimal policy from a tax to a subsidy. In spite of the lessons of the 'new'




*The authors have benefitted from the comments of Solomon Polachek, Jeffrey Pliskin,
and an anonymous referee on an earlier draft of this paper.
1Discussions of the assumptions and qualifications of these theorems are available
in standard textbooks such as Chacholiades (1979).
2Since it is not possible to mention all the contributors to this area of research, we
have attempted a representative selection of the most visible and provocative contributors.
Kierzkowski (1984), Helpman (1984), Dixit (1987), and Helpman and Krugman (1985,
1989) provide excellent overviews of imperfect competition, strategic interaction, and
international trade theory and policy.
3In particular, see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976). For a review of
strategic industrial organization, see in Tirole (1989).
4Examples include Eastman and Stykolt (1967), Economic Council of Canada
(1975), and Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1967).
5The effects of multilateral free trade on Canada provide a reasonable
approximation to the effects of U.S.-Canada bilateral tariff removal because the United
States, Canada's largest trade partner, accounts for 80 percent of Canada's trade.
6The presence of market imperfections such as wage rigidity or inter-industry
factor immobility sometimes serve as a basis for advocates of protectionism. These
policies, however, are often ill-advised since they are rarely a first best policy. The best
policy for correcting market imperfections which cause loses from international trade
usually involves a direct intervention in the affected market rather than at the border.
7A Stackelberg leader calculates its profit maximizing level of output incorporating
the information that its competitor will behave in a Cournot manner.
8This point was noted by an anonymous referee.
9Similar results were obtained by Matsuyama (1987).
10For examples of models which incorporate an efficient bargaining environment, see
Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) or Card (1986).
1 1See also Dickens and Lang (1988).
12Schultze (1989) and Topel (1989) express doubts about the ability of the analysis
to capture important unobserved differences.
13Problems associated with illegal immigration are discussed by Ethier (1986) and
Bond and Chen (1987).
1For a demonstration of the mutual gains from international factor mobility see
Ruffin (1984), though this point was first made by MacDougall (1960).
15This case is analogous to the difference between an import quota and a voluntary
export restraint in the market for goods.
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16The wage paid in the enclave is the same as the wage received in Mexico, so
enclave labor would not have an incentive to return to Mexico under this scheme.
1 7These papers incorporate views on human capital acquisition similar to those of




Baldwin, John R., and Paul K. Gorecki. The Role of Scale in Canada/U.S. Productivity
Differences in the Manufacturing Sector, 1970-1979. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1986.
Becker, Gary S. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of
Political Economy, LXX (October, 1962), 9-49.
Bond, Eric W., and Tain-Jy Chen. "The Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration," Journal
of International Economics, XXIII (November, 1987), 315-328.
Borsook, I. "Earnings, Ability and International Trade," Journal of International
Economics, XXII (May, 1987), 281-295.
Brander, James A. "Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities," Journal of
International Economics, XI (February, 1981), 1-14.
Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer. "Export Subsidies and International Market
Share Rivalry," Journal of International Economics, XVIII (February, 1985), 83-
100.
Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer. "Tariff Protection and Imperfect
Competition." In Henryk Kierzkowski, ed., Monopolistic Competition and
International Trade. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 194-206.
Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer. "Unionized Oligopoly and International Trade
Policy," Journal of International Economics, XXIV (May, 1988), 217-235.
Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer. "Foreign Direct Investment with
Unemployment and Endogenous Taxes and Tariffs," Journal of International
Economics, XXII (May, 1987), 257-279.
Brecher, Richard A. and Ehsan U. Choudhri. "International Migration Versus Foreign
Investment in the Presence of Unemployment," Journal of International Economics,
XXIII (November, 1987), 329-342.
Brown, James N., and Orley Ashenfelter. "Testing the Efficiency of Employment
Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, XCIV (June, 1986), S40-S87.
Calvo, Guillermo, and Stanislaw Wellisz. "International Factor Mobility and National
Advantage," Journal of International Economics, XIV (February, 1983), 103-114.
Card, David. "Efficient Contracts with Costly Adjustment: Short-Run Employment
Determination for Airline Mechanics," American Economic Review, LXX VI
(December, 1986), 1045-107 1.
Chacholiades, Miltiades. International Trade Theory and Policy. New York, NY:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978.
34
Das, Satya P. "Effects of Foreign Investment in the Presence of Unemployment," Journal
of International Economics, XI (May, 1981), 249-257.
Deardorff, Alan V. and Robert M. Stern. "Current Issues in Trade Policy: An Overview."
In Robert M. Stern, ed., U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 15-72.
Dickens, William T. and Kevin Lang. "Why It Matters What We Trade: A Case for Active
Policy." In Laura d'Andrea Tyson, William T. Dickens, and John Zysman, eds., The
Dynamics of Trade and Employment. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1988, pp. 87-112.
Dixit, Avinash. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policies for the US Automobile Industry."
In Robert C. Feenstra, ed., Empirical Methods for International Trade. Cambridge
MA: MIT Press, 1988, pp. 141-65.
Dixit, Avinash. "Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy." In Truman F. Bewley, ed.,
Advances in Economic Theory - Fifth World Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987, pp. 329-362.
Dixit, Avinash and Joseph E. Stiglitz. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product
Diversity," American Economic Review, LXVII (June, 1977), 297-308.
Eastman, H.C., and S. Stykolt. The Tariff and Competition in Canada. Toronto:
Macmillan, 1967.
Economic Council of Canada. Looking Outward, A New Trade Strategy for Canada.
Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975.
Ethier, Wilfred J. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic
Review, LXXVI (March, 1986), 56-71.
Ethier, Wilfred J. "International Trade and Labor Migration," American Economic
Review, LXXV (September, 1985), 691-707.
Findlay, Ronald and Henryk Kierzkowski. "International Trade and Human Capital: A
Simple General Equilibrium Model," Journal of Political Economy, XCI (December,
1983), 957-978.
Grossman, Gene M. "International Competition and the Unionized Sector," Canadian
Journal of Economics, XVII (August, 1984), 541-556.
Harris, Richard. "Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of Small Open Economies with
Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition," American Economic Review, LXXIV
(December, 1984), 1016-1032.
Helpman, Elhanan. "Increasing Returns, Imperfect Markets, and Trade Theory." In
Ronald W. Jones and Peter B. Kenen, eds., Handbook of International Economics,
Vol. I. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1984, pp. 325-365.
Helpman, Elhanan. "International Trade in the Presence of Product Differentiation,
Economies of Scale and Monopolistic Competition: A Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin
Approach," Journal of International Econornics, XI (August, 1981), 305-40.
f
35
Helpman, Elhanan and Paul R. Krugrnan. Market Structure and Foreign Trade.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985.
Helpman, Elhanan and Paul R. Krugman. Trade Policy and Market Structure.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989.
Hill, John K. "Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium Models with a Unionized
Sector," Journal of International Economics, XVI (May, 1984), 345-356.
Jones, Ronald W., Isaias Coelho, and Stephen T. Easton. "The Theory of International
Factor Flows: The Basic Model," Journal of International Economics, XX (May,
1986), 313-327.
Katz, Lawrence F. and Lawrence H. Summers. "Industry Rents: Evidence and
Implications," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1989, pp.
209-275.
Kierzkowski, Henryk. Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984.
Krugman, Paul R. "Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and International
Trade," Journal of International Economics, IX (November, 1979), 469-479.
Krugman, Paul R. "Scale Economies, Product Differentiation and the Pattern of Trade,"
American Economic Review, LXX (December, 1980), 950-959.
Krugman, Paul R. "Import Protection as Export Promotion." In Henryk Kierzkowski, ed.,
Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984,
pp. 180-193
Lancaster, Kelvin. Variety, Equity, and Efficiency. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1979.
Lancaster, Kelvin. "Intra-Industry Trade under Perfect Monopolistic Competition,"
Journal of International Economics, X (May, 1980), 151-175.
Lawrence, Colin and Robert Z. Lawrence. "Manufacturing Wage Dispersion: An End
Game Interpretation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1985, pp. 47-106.
MacDougall, George D. A. "The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from Abroad:
A Theoretical Approach," Economic Record, XXXVI (March, 1960), 13-35.
Markusen, James R. "Trade and Gains from Trade with Imperfect Competition," Journal
of International Economics, XI (November, 1981), 531-551.
Matsuyama, Kiminori. "Export Subsidies as an Outcome of Management-Labor
Conspiracy," Discussion paper, Department of Economics, Northwestern University,
1987.
Mincer, Jacob. "Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution," Journal
of Political Economy, LXVI (August, 1958), 281-302.
Ramaswami, V. K. "International Factor Movernent and the National Advantage,"
_Econnomica, XXXV (August, 1968), 309-310.
L
36
Ruffin, Roy J. "International Factor Movements." In Ronald W. Jones and Peter
B. Kenen, eds., Handbook of International Economics, Vol. I. Amsterdam: Elsevier
Science Publishers B. V., 1984, pp. 255-256.
Schultz, Theodore W. "Investment in Human Capital," American Economic Review, LI
(March, 1961), 1-17.
Schultze, Charles L. "Comment on Industry Rents: Evidence and Implications," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1989, pp. 280-283.
Spence, Michael E. "Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition,"
Review of Economic Studies, XLIII (June, 1976), 217-236.
Staiger, Robert W. "Organized Labor and the Scope of International Specialization,"
Journal of Political Economy, XCVI (October, 1988), 1022-1047.
Tirole, Jean. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1989.
Topel, Robert H. "Comment on Industry Rents: Evidence and Implications," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1989, pp. 283-288.
Venables, Anthony J. "Trade and Trade Policy with Imperfect Competition: The Case of
Identical Products and Free Entry," Journal of International Economics, XIX
(August, 1985), 1-20.
Wonnacott, Ronald J. Canada's Trade Options. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975.
Wonnacott, Ronald J. and Paul Wonnacott. Free Trade Between the United States and
Canada. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.
Brown
#252
P
P
Po-
MO-Ft
MC
MR D
q, 0 0
Figure 1

